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Abstract:  This  article  uses  economic  categories  to  show  how  the 
reorganisation of civil procedure in the case of class action is not merely 
aimed at providing a more efficient litigation technology, as hierarchies 
(and company law) might do for other productive activities, but that it 
also serves to create a well defined economic organization ultimately 
aimed at producing a set of goods, first and foremost among which are 
justice and efficiency.  
Class action has the potential to recreate, in the judicial domain, the 
same effects that individual interests and motivations, governed by the 
perfect competition paradigm, bring to the market. 
Moreover, through economic analysis it is possible to rediscover not 
only the productive function of this legal machinery, but also that partial 
compensation of victims and large profits for the class counsel, far from 
being a side-effect, are actually a necessary condition for reallocation of 
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1.  Introduction 
 
In recent decades, class action litigation has attracted growing attention from citizens 
and legislators around the world, by virtue of its ability to extend the protection of 
victims  where  traditional  methods—i.e.  individual  civil  action  and  regulation--have 
proven vulnerable.  
First introduced in the US legal system in 1938, through Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil  Procedure,  it  then  took  nearly  three  decades  for  class  action  to  be  fully 
implemented into US civil procedure, with the 1966 issuing of the new version of Rule 
23 by the Supreme Court. Since then,  class action has been fiercely  criticised by  a 
number of opponents, to the point of starting, in the 1970s, what has been described as a 
“holy war”
 (Hensler et al., 2000)
 1. However, despite these negative stances, it has over 
the years become “one of the most ubiquitous topics in modern civil law” in the US, and 
nowadays  one  of  “[t]he  reason  for  the  omnipresence  of  class  actions  lies  in  [its] 
versatility” (Epstein, 2003 p. 1) which, according to a great many commentators, can 
make it an effective means for serving justice and efficiency in a broad sense. 
The  collective  litigation  system  thus  continues  to  operate,  and  its  utility  remains 
undisputed in the North American judicial system. The most recent amendment, brought 
by  the  Class  Action  Fairness  Act  (CAFA,  2005),  though  aimed  according  to  some 
authors at curbing some of its pernicious features (Willging and Lee, 2007), carefully 
avoided criticising collective litigation as a whole, and in fact reaffirmed its substantive 
validity, strongly asserting that “class-action law suits are an important and valuable 
part of the legal system when they permit the fair and efficient resolution of legitimate 
claims of numerous parties by allowing the claims to be aggregated into a single action 
against a defendant that has allegedly caused harm” (CAFA, 2005, sect.2)
 2.  
The purpose of this article is to examine the productive nature of class action as  a 
litigation technology, identifying its peculiarities and the conditions under which this 
"legal  machinery"  can  produce  a  socially  efficient  outcome,  and  highlighting  any 
critical aspects.  
                                                 
1 Of course class action, like all juridical tools, is not per se a panacea for every possible situation. 
Critical concerns have been repeatedly addressed by scholars; among others, see Klement and Neeman 
(2004). 
2 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 2005.   3 
In  particular,  the  traditional  tools  of  economic  analysis  enable  us  to  identify  the 
characteristics and  "productive" conditions under which this judicial mechanism can 
create a specific risk market aimed at producing two instrumental goods, a profit for the 
attorney and protection of the victims, and one objective good consisting of deterrence, 
serving to promote efficiency.  
Adopting this perspective, we find not only that the ultimate goal of efficiency can be 
attained  even  without  full  compensation  of  victims,  but  also  that  this  eventuality, 
coupled with the attorney's appropriation of expected benefits, is in fact the currency 
that permits reallocation of the risk associated with the legal action.  
The article is organised as follows: section 2 sets out the principal features of class 
action, and discusses its idiosyncrasies with respect to standard civil procedure. Section 
3 reinterprets these features through the lens of economic theory, also with references to 
analogous  situations  that  have  led  to  the  emergence  of  ad  hoc  institutions;  this  is 
followed in section 4 by an examination of the economics of this particular juridical 
technology  that  successively  produces  private,  club  and  public  goods.  Section  5 
discusses  possible  alternative  solutions  to  class  action  for  extending  liability  and 
protection of victims. Section 6 sets out the conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Class action: key procedural features 
 
The first effect of class action is to permit the adjudication of meritorious claims that 
would  otherwise  not  be  litigated  due  to  imperfections  in  the  legal  systems  (Rodhe, 
2004). In fact, class action is a legal device employed today for tackling torts in a wide 
array of cases, including financial market and securities fraud in recent times (Porrini & 
Ramello,  2005  &  2011;  Ulen  2010).  However,  from  its  inception  class  action  was 
infused with a broader political agenda, extending beyond the tort domain to embrace 
matters  such  as  civil  rights  (in  particular  segregation),  health  protection,  consumer 
protection, environmental questions and many others (Hensler et al., 2000).  
As  a  whole,  class  action  has  the  effect  of  altering  the  balance  of  power  and  the 
distribution  of  wealth  among  the  various  social  actors  –e.g.  firms  vs.  consumers– 
thereby  extending  its  scope  in  terms  of  overall  impact  on  society.  All  the  above 
elements, taken together, thus play an important role in guiding the legislator's decision 
of  whether  (or  not)  to  adopt  class  action  and,  ultimately,  the  battle  in  favour  of  or   4 
against the introduction of class action into the different legal systems is played out on a 
purely political terrain (Porrini & Ramello, 2011)
3. 
Nonetheless, it is the procedural technicalities that have for the most part given sceptics 
grounds for criticising class action, and questioning its ability to be implemented in 
legal systems different from those where it arose. These are often specious arguments 
which  disregard  the  simple  fact  that  any  "juridical  technology"  intended  to  achieve 
certain outcomes must be adapted, in its design, to the constraints of the target legal 
system, if it is to provide regulatory solutions that are effective and compatible with its 
context. The heart of the problem, therefore, consists in opportunely adapting the “legal 
machinery” to each jurisdictional setting in a manner that obtains the desired results 
without  prejudicing  its  essential  features
4.
  In  the  case  of  class  actions,  these 
characterising features are: 
 
(i)  The aggregation of separate but essentially cognate claims, united by design 
and not by substantive theory.  
(ii)  The indirect representation of absent parties. 
(iii)  The  provision  of  entrepreneurial  opportunity  to  an  attorney,  who  thus 
becomes the main engine of the civil action. 
 
If we combine the three above elements, class action can essentially be described as a 
form  of  representational  lawsuit  that  eliminates  duplications  in  related  claims,  by 
aggregating all the potential claimants into a group--the class--and by giving a lawyer--
the class counsel--control over all of them. In other words, what makes class action a 
special legal device within civil procedure is the unusual feature of binding individuals 
with related claims, even if they were not originally named parties in the proceedings. 
As a result, once a judgment is handed down, it extinguishes all claims included in the 
                                                 
3 For example, the introduction of class action has generally been opposed by mass production firms as it 
would substantially increase their costs and likelihood of being prosecuted, as also by the insurance firms 
who would have to settle high claims (Hensler at al., 2000). In general “[g]iven their potential to transfer 
massive amounts of wealth and to reorganise important institutions, it should surprise no one that class 
actions are politically controversial” (Silver, 1999, p. 195). 
4 The efficacy of legal transplant has been widely debated, here again with advocates and detractors, 
starting from the seminal contributions of Watson (1974). The practice is however current, and there are 
many  instances--beginning  with  antitrust  law--showing  that,  with  the  needed  adjustments,  legal 
institutions can be transferred from one system to another.   5 
class, and not just those of the named parties. This means that everyone falling within 
the class is considered an absent class member and thus included de jure in the lawsuit, 
unless there is a specific opt-out request, as will be discussed below (Dam, 1975).  
The  obvious  main  consequence  is  that,  by  aggregating  similar  claims,  class  action 
increases the possibility of litigation, and so also the liability of wrongdoers who would 
otherwise not be sued by victims; hence, it may redress the imbalance which exists 
between plaintiffs and defendants in several areas of litigation.  
The indirect representation stems from the fact that the attorney is not appointed directly 
by each individual claimant, but rather through a specific set of procedures established 
by law, which essentially rely upon the initiative of a minority among them, and the 
subsequent acceptance by the judge, to start the trial (Hensleret al., 2000). In fact, the 
civil action is filed by an individual or a small group of victims assisted by an attorney. 
The class is then certified by the judge who consequently also ‘appoints’ the attorney as 
a representative of all the class members (Dam, 1975). 
It is worth noting that the mere appointment of a class counsel does not, of course, per 
se  assure  attainment  of  any  efficient  outcome,  nor  does  it  rule  out  opportunistic 
behaviours (Harnay & Marciano, 2011). It is only a first step for making the desired 
outcomes  possible  and,  as  usual  in  tort  litigation,  demands  a  well  designed  set  of 
incentives for the lawyer in order to work properly (Klement & Neeman, 2004; Sacconi, 
2010). On the other hand, indirect representation and the need for proper incentives are 
likewise found in regulation, where the public agency acts as a parens patriae on behalf 
of interested parties, and is charged with pursuing the public (rather than the individual) 
interest by means of a specialised bureaucracy (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2003). Accordingly, 
the puzzle cannot be solved by fostering regulation as a substitute for litigation. 
This last is a significant point because class action does bear some similarities—albeit 
limited  to  the  civil  procedure  domain—to  regulation:  in  fact,  where  the  judge 
determines that individual actions may not be sufficiently effective, yet the litigation is 
in the collective interest, on request of a representation of victims she reallocates the 
individual rights over that particular prospective litigation. Thus, also in this case, an 
agent is nominated to represent the interests of a group, but with a narrower scope 
compared to fully fledged regulation. Here, the indirect representation serves merely to 
exploit  the  possibility  of  aggregating  related  claims  without  bearing  the  costs  of 
searching for and coordinating a huge number --often a “mass”-- of potential plaintiffs, 
that would otherwise make bringing the lawsuit unaffordable.    6 
Finally, there is one last feature that makes collective action possible: it is the creation 
of a specific entrepreneurial space for the class counsel, who undertakes to identify an 
unmet demand for justice and, acting self-interestedly, restores access to legal action for 
the victims. The class counsel is generally driven by the purely utilitarian motives of a 
"bounty hunter", who offers a service in exchange for recompense. It is thus a behaviour 
consistent with the paradigm of methodological individualism, and which is sometimes 
regarded  with  suspicion  by  those  who  consider  private  interests  unsuitable  for 
representing  the  collective  interest.  Such  misgivings  have,  moreover,  helped  give 
support to regulation over individual civil action on the grounds that, as Justice Robert 
Young suggests (2001, p. 3) “in the judiciary, the process, though public in name, is 
private in essence”
 5. Yet this mechanism, endorsed by economic theory starting from 
the paradigm of the invisible hand, also underpins the economic analysis of law, given 
that  many  institutions,  beginning  with  property  rights,  are  designed  to  promote  the 
collective interest through individual initiative (Ramello, 2011).  
Hence, the reluctance to pursue collective welfare through private interest is not only 
theoretically unfounded (and in fact contradicts decades of scientific investigation), but 
also  assumes  the  peculiar  and  unproven  hypothesis  that  it  is  possible  to  select  for 
particular roles–such as regulators or public prosecutors– special human beings entirely 
unmoved by individual utility, and who are on the contrary able to exclusively promote 
the collective interest without any eye to their private benefit. The reality appears to be 
greatly different
6. 
Class action thus has the particular merit of aligning the private interest of the case 
attorney, who seeks to obtain a profit, with that of the victims, who seek redress of the 
harm and promotion of justice, and with that of society which instead benefits from a 
system that internalises the externality. This in fact creates a deterrent to wrongdoing 
and ultimately works to minimise the social costs, in accordance with Hand’s rule. In 
                                                 
5 This is in fact an old debate that has for at least one hundred years pitted the administrative against the 
judiciary, and helped trigger what has been termed the ‘rise of the regulatory state’ (Glaeser & Shleifer, 
2003) . 
6 Judges, public prosecutors and regulators are individuals who have the same motivations and behaviours 
as  other  economic  actors.  Therefore,  there  is  no  solution  in  which  the  methodological  individualism 
assumed by economic theory can be eliminated. For example, with respect to judges, the scholar and 
“judge” Posner (1994) notes that not only is this a mythological category populated by heroes, titans and 
saints, but also that all its members, as the title of his essay states, “maximise the same thing everybody 
else does”.    7 
this light, therefore, the miracle of the invisible hand is again renewed, and the self-
interest of the victims and class counsel can play a role of public relevance. 
 
 
3.  What can economics further tell us about class action ? 
 
The tools of economic analysis and efficiency are further brought into play when we 
consider the wider effects of class action on the judicial system and on the economic 
system. In particular, economic science offers two complementary routes for conducting 
such  an  analysis.  The  first  concerns  the  manner  in  which  class  action  can  serve 
efficiency  and  collective  welfare;  the  second  provides  the  analytical  framework  for 
representing  the  legal  machinery  and  studying  its  workings,  thus  determining  under 
what conditions and in what way class action promotes social welfare. 
However, for the investigation to be fruitful, we have to specify the initial conditions, 
i.e. the circumstances under which regulation and individual action are not effective. In 
other words, we must define the context that gives rise to a failure to protect victims, 
which is the prerequisite for introducing a new legal device (Silver, 1999; Ramello & 
Porrini, 2005). The conditions for this failure are the following:  
  
·  Existence of fragmented claims, very often worth less to each plaintiff than 
the  individual  litigation  cost,  or  which  in  any  case  entail  a  prohibitively 
costly individual litigation. 
·  Sufficient homogeneity of claims for the court to issue a "one size fits all" 
decision, and for the victims to be able to adhere to the collective action. 
·  A judicial market failure, as a result of which some claims, no matter how 
meritorious,  are  not  brought,  so  that  certain  individuals  are  unable  to 
exercise their rights.  
·  A failure of regulation which thus does not offer a practicable alternative for 
resolving the preceding issues.  
 
 
The conditions under which class action is potentially useful are those where certain 
rights  established  by  law  are  not  exercised,  or  only  imperfectly  exercised,  due  to  a 
misalignment  between  what  is  theoretically  asserted  by  the  law  and  the  concrete   8 
incentives provided to individuals. Such a circumstance is by no means new to the law 
and economics literature, and for example also emerges in the case of property rights: 
the mere possession of the right does not necessarily result in its being exercised, even 
when  this  would  be  opportune  and  socially  efficient.  This  condition  creates  a 
discontinuity in the laws, and renders them incomplete (Barzel 1997). In the case of 
property,  for  example,  the  described  situation  occurs  where  there  is  excessive 
fragmentation of rights, or in the presence of market imperfections which push up the 
costs of the exchange, resulting in a market failure
7.  
The  solution  involves  an  institutional  reorganisation  to  produce  a  lowering  of  these 
costs and/or promote the--sometimes forced--reallocation of the rights. Examples of this 
are  the  aggregation  of  rights  in  the  case  of  patent  pools  (Gallini,  2011),  and  the 
compulsory  licensing  systems  established  for  intellectual  property,  or  for  essential 
facilities  in  antitrust,  as  also  the  takings  of  private  land  (Nicita  &  Ramello,  2007; 
Mercuro, 1992)
8. 
By  thus  regarding  victims  as  owners  of  "property  rights"  over  a  specific  litigation, 
whose enforcement may incur costs exceeding the expected individual benefits, we can 
interpret  class  action  as  a  system  that  follows  a  comparable  judicial  path  to  that 
described for property, aggregating the individuals' rights when their exercise on the 
judicial market is precluded (or limited) by contingencies which make the net benefit of 
the action negative.  
In general, these contingencies arise from the aforesaid fragmentation and its attendant 
coordination costs, from the limited size of the individual damages (so-called “small 
claims”), and also from the existence of asymmetries between the would-be plaintiffs 
and defendant (i.e. availability of information, capacity to manage the litigation risk, 
access to financial resources, and more).  
Creating  a  pool  of  rights  thus  enables  victims  to  access  a  less  costly  litigation 
technology, and thereby pursue justice. The productive efficiency of a static character 
concerns the overall production of "justice", on the demand and supply sides, since on 
                                                 
7 The example here essentially refers to situations such as the anticommons, where a lack of coordination 
connected with the cost of using the market for excessively fragmented rights, or the strategic use of 
property by some right holders in order to extract all the surplus created by the exchange--the so called 
“holdout problem”--frustrates achievement of a socially desirable outcome (Heller, 2008).  
8 The law and economics literature shows, for example, how property laws are designed to smooth the 
workings of the market, restoring rights to their legitimate holders where possible, or reallocating them to 
new actors when the previous solution is not practicable.   9 
the judicial market both jointly concur to its production, albeit for different reasons. 
Class action in fact allows a so-called “judicial economy” to emerge,  which on the 
demand  side,  through  aggregation  of  small  claims,  produces  economies  of  scale  in 
litigation that cause individual costs to decrease with increasing number of plaintiffs 
(Bernstein,  1977).  On  the  supply  side,  there  is  likewise  a  reduction  in  costs  if  the 
aggregation  permits  overall  savings  in  resources  compared  to  multiple  individual 
actions, provided though that the savings afforded by aggregation are not offset by an 
increase in the number of lawsuits
9.  
There is, then, a second level of efficiency connected with the economic nature of class 
action,  and  which  has  the  purpose  of  aligning  different  interests  to  achieve  the 
previously stated goal. In effect, the system, if properly applied, has to introduce a set of 
distinct incentives which together concur to produce three different outputs: a profit for 
the attorney, redress of the harm for the victims, and deterrence of wrongdoing (thereby 
minimising the social cost) for society.  
In other words, the role of class action is to reconcile the conjoined individual interests 
of victims with the collective interest of society, by passing through the private interest 
of the class counsel. It thus has the nature of a private good for the attorney, who takes 
on the entrepreneurial role of setting in motion the collective action, which is in its turn 
aimed at obtaining redress of the harm (Dam, 1975). Though this ultimately has an 
effect on each victim, it can only be produced as a local public good for the cohort of all 
victims, and thus takes the form of a club good. Finally, the transfer of the cost of the 
wrongdoing from the victims to the injurer has the consequence of re-establishing a 
higher  level  of  deterrence,  thereby  resulting  in  production  of  a  public  good.  This 
deterrence, it is worth noting, pertains to what is generally termed dynamic efficiency, 
since  its  production  in  a  given  time  frame  is  also  instrumental  to  the  intertemporal 
optimal production of other goods. 
The described mechanism thus works to promote various economic interests, and at the 
same  time  enhances  efficiency  by  favouring  the  internalisation  of  externalities, 
                                                 
9 This aspect is naturally ambiguous with respect to the supply side, due to the need to balance the judicial 
costs  with  the  social  costs.  Thus  class  action  brings  about  a  net  saving  if  it  reduces  the  number  of 
lawsuits, but may also increase their number if it makes possible suits that would otherwise not have been 
brought. Even so, however, it can still produce a net saving if the deterrence effect, as we shall discuss, 
reduces the social cost. Naturally this requires that it doesn't produce another externality, connected with 
court congestion (Chappe, 2011).   10 
reconfirming  the  instrumental  role  of  tort  law  in  reducing  the  risk  of  accidents 
(Calabresi, 1970).  
Therefore, the points discussed thus far can fully account for the economic role of class 
action, whose characteristics and workings can be investigated through the customary 
analysis tools provided by the theory.  
 
 
4.  Class action and the production of goods: the analytical framework 
 
As discussed above, class action works by rearranging property rights over a specific 
claim, to promote the attainment of an efficient organisation in litigation. Through the 
attorney, it restores the  incentive for claimants  to bring the suit, thereby  reinstating 
access to justice and, in consequence, enhancing deterrence.  
Using the traditional categories of economic analysis, we can represent the described 
situation and interpret the "productive" roles of the various actors taking part in the class 
action. For simplicity, let us image a scenario where the injurer has unilateral control 
over the level of care, and the level of activity is extensive, thus better handled by a 
strict  liability  regime  in  which  the  cost  of  the  accident  is  borne  by  the  defendant, 
irrespective of the level of precaution taken. According to law and economics theory, 
the rule of strict liability with perfect compensation thus causes the injurer to internalise 
the costs and benefits of precaution, which gives the injurer an incentive for efficient 
care. Full internalisation of the damage by the tortfeasor fulfils Hand’s condition, under 
which the social marginal cost of care equals its social marginal benefit, and so makes it 
possible to minimise the expected social cost of accidents (Calabresi, 1970; Brown, 
1973).  
 
The class as a club  
 
The organisation of plaintiffs into a “class” corresponds to what in economic theory is 
termed a “club”, that is to say a “group of individuals who derive mutual benefit from 
sharing one or more of the following: production costs, attributes of the members, or 
goods characterised by excludable benefits” (Cornes & Sandler, 1996, p. 347).  
This results in the production and ensuing consumption of specific goods that would not 
otherwise be produced: the club good is an excludable but non-rivalrous public good for   11 
the  club  members.  Therefore  it  is  congestible,  in  the  sense  that  an  increase  in  the 
number of members will at some point negatively affect their benefits.  
In the case of class action, the club good is the reinstated access to justice and the 
resultant redress of the wrong, which is then naturally shared out among the individual 
members. Though the compensation is ultimately private, its collective production is a 
club good. In accordance with the literature on clubs, collective litigation and damages 
are  non  rivalrous  for  the  victims  once  the  lawsuit  has  been  started,  but  excludable 
through  certification  by  the  judge  (Silver,  1999).  The  role  of  excludability  here  is 
twofold:  on  the  one  hand,  in  accordance  with  club  theory,  it  is  needed  in  order  to 
provide the proper incentive to the club members, as otherwise free-riding would be 
possible (Cornes & Sandler, 1996); and on the other hand, excludability is the element 
which distinguishes the judiciary from regulation, since in the absence of exclusion the 
class could conceivably include everyone, making it no different from regulation. It is 
worth noting that we are assuming here a failure of regulation, so that any equivalence 
between regulation and litigation cannot be envisaged without necessarily implying a 
negative outcome also for the latter. 
Compared to traditional clubs, opt-in for class action is partly determined by the injurer, 
who “creates” the category of potential victims, and subsequently refined by the judge 
who certifies the class, i.e. defines those who have the right to take part in the litigation 
(Issacharoff, 1997). This peculiar situation places a limit on the number of members, 
and  is  consequently  useful  for  remedying  the  potential  congestion  that  is  a  typical 
problem  of  clubs.  Opt-out  then  permits  a  further  fine-tuning,  also  benefitting  the 
victims’ choices. In fact, each member of the class has the residual right to express his 
or her will by opting out, and thereby exiting the collective litigation. This solution thus 
preserves the voluntariness requirement which generally characterises membership of a 
club, and would otherwise be of necessity violated (Cornes & Sandler, 1996).  
What is more, opt-out provides a sanity check for the undemonstrated assertion that the 
class action is the proper solution for protecting individual rights. In fact, if the class 
action were not the optimal solution for safeguarding the individual victims (or if the 
certification of the class were incorrect, which is an equivalent situation) the members 
of the class would still have the opportunity to opt out and choose individual litigation 
instead.  This  solution  therefore  introduces  a  sort  of  competition  between  different   12 
litigation technologies, and hence assures optimality–i.e. maximising of the expected 
net benefit–to the individual members
10.  
It is interesting to note that, compared to the difficulties highlighted by club theory, 
class action presents a fairly manageable case since it groups together homogeneous 
members–victims who have suffered a comparable harm. Legal practice bears out this 
assertion, since in cases of significant dissimilarity of victims and harms the judges do 
not certify the class, or have the possibility of invalidating the action in progress
11. 
Thus, given a population of  } { m N ,..., 1 =  individuals--i.e. all of humanity--only a part 
of these will possess the characteristics for being included in the subset of victims V , 
that is to say  N V Ì . Formation of the club, from a legal standpoint, in fact requires 
certification of a class of size  n, which may of course be smaller or greater than the 
actual number of victims. The judge's discretionary power stems from the need to define 
a group of claimants that is sufficiently homogenous to make collective action possible. 
For each victim, the alternative options are to file an individual suit against the injurer, 
or to do nothing. The cost of the litigation  ) (n c is zero if no lawsuit is brought, and 
otherwise  generally  increases  with  the  number  of  individuals  for  values  1 ³ n .  The 
representation  can  thus  be  expressed  as  the  following  dichotomic  formula,  which 













n c  
 
Where  f  is the fixed cost for embarking on the litigation, and  z is the marginal cost for 
each individual member of the group. The fixed cost can be regarded as the price of 
admission to the judicial market, which must be paid whenever a legal action is brought; 
it might for example include expenses such as expert surveys or other technicalities 
specific to the litigation, and is essentially a set-up cost for establishing a club of any 
                                                 
10 A similar evaluation of whether the class action is superior to individual litigation is also made by the 
judge at the time of certification. 
11 This is for example what happened for two proposed class action settlements for asbestos litigation that 
were invalidated by the US Supreme Court on these grounds, in Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor 521 
U. S. 591, 1997, and in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. 527 U. S. 815, 1999, and which nevertheless were able 
to benefit from consolidated litigations.   13 
size,  having  1  or  more  members.  Therefore,  if  each  victim  n  pursues  the  route  of 
individual litigation,  f  will be incurred n times.  
The described cost function therefore exhibits increasing returns to scale for the number 
of joint plaintiffs, that is to say  z
n
f
n AC + = ) (  with  0 ) ( < ¢ n C A . This hypothesis is 
consistent with the literature, which in fact interprets clubs as a method for pursuing 
cost-sharing arrangements and producing economies of scale (Cornes & Sandler, 1996). 
The described situation thus qualifies efficiency from the standpoint of demand, since it 
makes  individual  participation  more  accessible  with  increasing  number  of  club 
members. According to the literature, economies of scale legitimately arise from the 
presence  of  significant  indivisibilities  in  production,  resolvable  only  through  the 
creation of extensive productive hierarchies that can, in the case under study, take the 
form of a class (Edwards and Starr, 1984). What is more, the nature of a club, as a more 
efficient instrument for providing members with an excludable but non rivalrous good, 
equally  presupposes  the  existence  of  indivisibilities  in  production  (as  otherwise 
individual production would be more efficient). 
The harm  h, once it has taken place, has a finite value and is uniformly distributed 
among  the  victims;  a  substantial  homogeneity  of  the  victims,  as  noted  above,  is  a 
prerequisite for certifying the class, without which the litigation is invalidated. This 
likewise  strengthens  recourse  to  the  club  as  an  instrument  for  redressing  a  harm 
common to all the members. 
For simplicity, let us hypothesise also that the claimants are neutral to risk and that their 
utility is therefore described by the expected total gross benefit  ) (n b , concave and twice 
differentiable. This simplification merely assumes that enlargement of the class will at 
some point negatively affect the expected gross benefit, so that the potential profits for 
the class members do not increase with increasing class size, in line with the congestible 
nature of clubs. The function thus described represents a sort of gross return, before 
payment of litigation costs, that is hypothesised to be non-negative at least for a wide 
range of values of n. These returns, net of the costs (and of any top up for the attorney, 
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Victims' cost-benefit analysis 
 
The condition which determines the failure of individual litigation is when  ) ( ) ( n c n b <  
for values of  1 ³ n . It is of course intuitively apparent that such a situation depends both 
on the size of the expected return and on the cost: for very small values of f , that is to 
say  when  the  price  of  admission  to  the  litigation  is  low,  it  is  easier  for  the  failure 
condition to be averted. Likewise, if  ) (n b  is small–the typical example being that of  
small claims–the failure of the individual action is more probable. 
In particular, for a judicial market failure of individual litigation to occur, the condition 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( c b <  must be met, and the condition which remedies the failure is the definition of 
a class of size n such that:  
 
0 ) ( ) ( ³ - n c n b     (1) 
 
The above condition thus has the nature of a participation constraint, which justifies the 
introduction of class action to reinstate the efficacy of tort law. However, if due to some 
error individual action is able to produce a greater net benefit than collective action, 
each class member--as we have seen--has the opportunity of opting out, which also 
yields the incentive compatibility constraint, according to the condition: 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( c b n c n b - > -     (2) 
 
The above thus confirms the possibility of certifying a class of size  n n n ˆ £ £ , for which 
the collective action produces a non-negative net benefit, representing the set of all 
values for which class action is a solution.  
At the endpoints of the range, the expected net benefit for claimants is zero, since the 
gross benefits are equal to the costs, while for intermediate values there is a profit to the 
class  for  litigating  the  claim.  Figure  1  shows  a  graphical  representation  of  the  case 
where the conditions for failure of individual litigation apply, while it is possible to 
define  a  population  ] [ n n n ˆ , Î   for  which  the  collective  action  is  profitable.  For 
convenience, given the cost function, the origin of the abscissa corresponds to the case 
of one victim. 
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Figure 1 approximately here 
 
Minimising  the  social  cost  of  accidents  requires  applying  the  criterion  of  full 
internalisation derived from the strict liability rule (Brown, 1973). Such an outcome 
depends  essentially  on  the  determination  of  the  external  cost,  and  then  of  the 
damagesd ,  which  are  not  univocally  defined,  but  rather  contingent  on  specific 
evaluations and, in part, on the prevailing judicial system. In particular, the level of 
damages established by the judge or jury reflects the concept of harm that is adopted, 
and the number of identified victims. 
Let us for now hypothesise a strictly cost-based compensation for the class counsel (i.e. 
no  positive  profits  are  possible  for  the  attorney):  technically,  the  damages  awarded 
should be equal to  h if the American Rule is applied, as usually happens for US class 
actions
12. This definition stems from a specific interpretation of “external cost” that 
focuses exclusively on the specific harm, without for example including the externality 
of the litigation. In such a case, full compensation of the victims can never be achieved, 
since  by  definition  h n c n b h h < - ) ( ) (   ;  such  a  situation  also  frequently  arises  in 
individual litigation, and is unrelated to full internalisation of the damage by the injurer. 
Some legal systems seek to partly overcome this problem by adopting the English Rule, 
which is a mechanism for cost-shifting to the losing party. This system thus enables 
plaintiffs who win the dispute to obtain greater benefits, but also renders the nature of 
the costs probabilistic, with a probability distribution that can significantly impact upon 
the constraints (1) and (2) which determine the choices of the would-be plaintiffs. In 
any case, there is a wide range of values for which the expected net benefit for victims 
(and,  as  we  shall  see,  the  net  compensation  expected  by  the  class  counsel)  remain 
unaltered,  preserving  the  favourable  outcome  of  the  collective  litigation
13.  The 
                                                 
12 The English Rule, adopted in many jurisdictions, provides that the losing party must pay the winner’s 
reasonable fees, while the American Rule requires each party litigating the dispute to be responsible for 
paying its own attorney's fees. Whether the former or the latter is better suited for promoting efficiency is 
outside the scope of the present paper (ref. e. g. Eisenberg & Miller, 2010). 
13 Intuitively, the cost function will be zero with a certain probability  1 0 < < f  if the suit is won 
(increasing the net benefit), or will increase by a coefficient  1 > m  if the suit is lost. Therefore, there 
exist values for which the two components cancel each other out. For example a plausible relation is 
m f / 1 1- = , which implies, for instance, that with a 50% probability of winning, the costs in case of 
losing will be double those directly incurred.    16 
consequences can in fact be more onerous for the defendant, who in the event of losing 
is forced to pay damages equal to  ) (n c h + . 
Yet  this  last-mentioned  situation  is  still  compatible  with  the  American  Rule  if  we 
consider the possibility, in the US system, of introducing punitive damages. These can 
be considered, in whole or in part, as a way to internalise the litigation cost imposed on 
the class, thereby reconciling the system with a broader definition of external cost
14. In 
this situation the model requires defining a class of size  r n  such that  h n c n b r r = - ) ( ) (  
which  in  figure  1  makes  it  possible  to  cover  all  external  costs.  Therefore  punitive 
damages (as also application of the English Rule under certain conditions) can lead to 
the definition of a larger class, compared to the case without this remedy. Yet if we 
consider the bounded rationality that generally impinges on legal action, the risk of 
defining an overly large club is less than that of underestimating its size, which would 
make the legal action as a whole inefficient, as we shall discuss below. 
Consider,  furthermore,  the  following  different  scenarios  for  punitive  damages  (or 
English Rule), in which maximising of the net benefit occurs with a class of size  * n  for 
which the condition  z n b = ¢ *) (  is met. It is possible that this class corresponds to that 
which  fully  internalises  the  overall  harm  ) (n c h + ,  in  which  case  it  represents  the 
optimal and maximum size of the class. When this is not true, for example because full 
internalisation  is  not  possible  in  any  case  (imagine  a  downward  shift  of  the  curve 
) (n b in figure 1) the class of size  * n  will nevertheless still represent an second best. 
Finally, there is the case where the damages granted either produce full internalisation 
of the harm before maximising of the net benefit takes place, or follow the American 
Rule: the class certified by the judge will in any case be of size  * n n < , for example in 
the figure for  r n  or  h n .  
With  respect  to  the  three  possible  scenarios,  * n   represents  the  upper  limit  for 
certification  of  the  class  by  the  judge,  irrespective  of  the  criteria  followed  for 
internalising the damage
15. 
The  above  reasoning  applies  equally  to  the  case  of  settlement,  if  the  value  agreed 
between the parties reflects what was has been discussed previously; it is thus possible 
to imagine an equation for the expected net benefits that incorporates a possibility of 
                                                 
14 For an in depth discussion of punitive damages ref. Cenini, Luppi and Parisi (2011). 
15 Naturally, it is assumed that in case of punitive damages the plaintiffs will be able to include these in 
the function  ) (n b  which will have a higher or lower maximum depending on the criterion used.   17 
paying  "discounted"  costs  in  the  case  of  early  settlement.  Under  certain  conditions, 
similar to those discussed for the English Rule, the outcome may produce an expected 
net  benefit  comparable  to  what  has  been  described.  Though  the  transactions  will 
generally  be  for  lower  sums  than  the  potential  damages,  the  costs  will  also  be 
correspondingly reduced. This, of course, provided that the settlement does not lead the 
class counsel to act opportunistically toward victims, in collusion with the defendant. 
However, settlements, too, are generally scrutinised in detail and approved by the judge 
only  after submitting the proposal to the victims and considering any objections, in 
order to minimise the likelihood of adverse outcomes, which as a consequence are not 
the norm (Koniak & Cohen, 1996). 
 
 
A fistful of dollars: the entrepreneurial role of the attorney 
 
The  hypothesis  of  a  strictly  cost-based  compensation  for  the  class  counsel,  though 
convenient for the discussion thus far, is not consistent with the rationale of class action, 
which relies on the attorney’s animal spirits as an instrument for triggering the litigation 
(Dam, 1975).  
In fact, the notion of transferring the initiative to the class counsel requires creating 
sufficient economic incentives to motivate the counsel to act. It is naturally crucial, in 
this context, to define a suitable mechanism for appropriating part of the benefits of the 
legal action on one the one hand, and for reallocating the risk and, subsequently, the 
expected benefits/costs on the other hand (Backhaus, 2011). In effect, the failure of 
individual action depends on a negative balance between expected costs and benefits for 
individual victims, and the same thing can also happen in the case of a collective action, 
if the costs are known but the benefits highly uncertain. In such a case, the victims' 
decision  to  bring  the  civil  action  is  also  dependent  on  their  combined  capacity 
(generally rather limited) to manage the risk. 
Class action has developed a system for managing risk which, similarly to what happens 
with productive organisations, shifts it to those actors who are best able to manage it 
(Porrini & Ramello, 2011). This aspect clearly emerges if we consider the scheme for 
compensating the class counsel. In effect, the traditional fee-for-service determination 
here  appears  somewhat  problematic,  due  to  certain  inherent  features  of  collective 
litigation:  the  victims  are  dispersed  and  the  class  action,  to  circumvent  the   18 
insurmountable costs of finding and coordinating all the class members (most of whom 
are absent), relies on indirect representation. Therefore, it is not possible to collect a 
per-capita fee ex ante; and if it were possible to do so ex post, the absent club members, 
once identified, could in case of failure of the litigation avoid payment by choosing to 
opt out.  
The only practicable solution thus appears to be to grant a right to appropriate potential 
returns in exchange for known costs; this solution is called a contingent fee reward 
scheme, because it sets benefits discounted by a probability of less than 1 against known 
costs, and in order to be economically acceptable to the attorney requires the attribution 
of profits far exceeding the costs in case of success.  
Now, considering that the damages must cover the costs, remunerate the class counsel 
and provide at least a minimal compensation for the victims, they will generally need to 
be considerably high.  
If, for example, the expected gross benefit of the class counsel  ) (n x is a probabilistic 
value  that  permits  appropriation  of  a  share  1 0 < <q of  the  expected  benefits,  the 
following condition must be met:  
 
) ( ) ( ) ( n c n b n x ³ =q     (3) 
 
That  is  to  say,  the  amount  must  be  non  negative,  and  thus  its  minimum  value 
corresponds  precisely  to  the  expected  cost-based  fee.  Jurisprudence  shows  that 
appropriation occurs for a positive coefficientq , defined in consultation with the judge, 
having a value  3 , 0 2 , 0 -  (Klement & Neeman, 2004; Eisenberg & Miller, 2004).  





n b ³ and considering the values indicated by 
legal practice, we obtain a sort of “golden rule” showing that class actions generally 
require an expected gross benefit for the class of at least 3 times the litigation cost; in 
other words, the class action must generally produce an amply positive surplus. 
This result first of all shows that the requirement of a non-negative profit for the counsel 
forces  overly  costly  and  unprofitable  class  actions  out  of  the  market.  We  can  thus 
formulate a first efficiency criterion, and namely that class action litigation technology 
is not a panacea for every harm. 
A second criterion is the de facto requirement for total returns that amply exceed costs, 
and  which  serve  partly  to  cover  the  costs  and  partly  to  compensate  victims,  whilst   19 
leaving a further reserve of appropriability for the entrepreneurial attorney, who is the 
trigger that makes class action effective where individual action fails. 
In effect, the logic of class action presupposes the creation of a sort of legal monopoly 
for  the  counsel  over  the  specific  collective  litigation.  Now,  even  though  such  a 
monopoly is regulated by the judge's intervention in defining the coefficient q , the very 
structure of litigation leads the class counsel to extract a substantial quasi-rent. Given 
that  there  is  an  opportunity  cost  of  foregoing  other  profitable  activities,  potentially 
having a higher likelihood of yielding benefits, the attorney must not only fulfil (3), 
which represents his participation constraint, but also secure a return such that:  
 
x n c n x ³ - ) ( ) (     (4) 
 
Where  x corresponds to the foregone profit of alternative activities. Equation (4) is the 
incentive compatibility constraint for the attorney. 
Without  loss  of  generality,  assume  for  example  that  the  alternative  activity  is  paid 
through a fixed fee established ex ante (for example a standard legal action with no 
contingent fee), and rewrite equation (3) expressing the probability, i.e. 
 
* ) ( px n x =       (5) 
 
Where the probability is  1 0 < < p  and  * x is the fee effectively received if the case is 







³ . This shows not 
only that the effective fee received by the class counsel in case of winning must be 
sufficiently large to cover costs and foregone alternative profits, but also that, to take 




is by definition always greater than 1, and increases with diminishing probability of 
winning
16.  
The class counsel in effect takes on the claimant's risk in exchange for the right to 
appropriate a share of the returns that is far greater than the costs. This mechanism, 
                                                 
16 It is easy to see that the external lower bound is  1
1
lim 1 = ® p
p . Now, since by definition  0 < p , the 
multiplier is consequently always greater than 1.   20 
which transforms the attorney into a bounty hunter, should not be considered suspect 
and is in fact the second strong point of class action, because it creates a market for 
allocating the risk to the actor best equipped to manage it. The standard equation here is 
that the entrepreneurial attorney fosters the protection of the victims’ rights in exchange 
for  a  share  of  the  awarded  damages,  as  a  reward  for  the  risk.  On  the  whole,  this 
possibility--which in general works better with contingent fees--alters the cost-benefit 
ratio for the individual and provides the incentive to proceed (Dam, 1975; Eisenberg & 
Miller, 2004). 
The reasons for the class counsel's superior capacity to manage the risk stem from a 
number of factors, the most significant being specialisation, and the ability to create a 
portfolio of diversified risks which, taken together, lower the average risk.  
The described solution has a secondary consequence that is equally useful for realigning 
risk and its management among the parties to the proceeding, since class counsel and 
defendant are placed on a more equal footing, also in this respect, compared to the 
relation between victim and wrongdoer.  
What is more, the imperfection of capital markets generally make access to external 
financing  impracticable  for  the  victim,  who  likewise  has  limited  personal  liquidity, 
whereas here again the class counsel is better placed and can more easily secure or 
obtain the resources required for the legal action (Dana & Spier, 1993). 
Overall, we thus see the emergence of a new organisational configuration, indispensable 
for making the civil action possible, which recreates in the judicial sphere a sort of 
financial market provided with all its own instruments: in the final analysis, therefore, 
the contingent fee, with its attendant uncertainty, can be interpreted as a stock option 
that makes it possible to align the interests of the attorney with those of the represented 
clients,  who  here  become  stock  holders  of  the  legal  action  (Backhaus,  2011;  Dam 
1975)
17. 
The above discussion therefore shows that: (a) partial compensation for victims can still 
be consistent with the efficiency paradigm, if defined as an equilibrium on the risk 
market,  and  (b)  even  where  there  is  only  partial  compensation,  the  public  good  of 
deterrence  can  still  be  produced.  In  this  case,  the  club  good  becomes  merely 
                                                 
17 The literature concurs on the fact that “if the attorney were paid either a fixed fee or an hourly fee, then 
she would have little financial incentive to reveal to her client that the case had a low expected return. 
Instead she might lead the plaintiff blindly into litigation regardless of the case’s merit” (Dana & Spier, 
1993, p. 350).   21 
instrumental to the existence of the legal action, and so long as the victims express at 
least a minimum of satisfaction, even if only because "justice is done", and thus do not 
choose to opt-out en masse, the mechanism works perfectly and the injurer is forced to 
internalise the social costs, even if a significant portion of the damages are in practice 
appropriated by the class counsel.  
In the worst case there will be a pure economic loss which, in accordance with what has 
been discussed in the law and economics literature, pertains strictly to the distribution of 
wealth  without  detrimental  consequences  on  collective  welfare  (Porrini  &  Ramello, 
2005)
18. 
Obviously, this consequence is somewhat puzzling for those who maintain that tort law 
should be first and foremost concerned with compensation, to restore the original utility 
of the victim; instead, what emerges here once again is the pro-efficiency function of 
tort law, even in the absence of full compensation.  
That said, it is worth noting that when the victims' compensation is zero, class action 
again comes to resemble regulation, with the class counsel acting on behalf of claimants 




5.  Are there alternatives to class action ? 
 
The criticisms of class action presuppose that there exist better alternatives for pursuing 
social welfare through internalisation of the damage. By definition, the existence of 
class  action  stems  from  a  failure  of  both  regulation  and  individual  litigation.  The 
practicable  alternatives  which  remain  are  therefore  suing  for  damages  in  a  criminal 
court,  or  successive  civil  actions  to  create  a  sort  of  intertemporal  club  that  brings 
together all the victims under the aegis of a precedent. 
In the alternative of criminal proceedings, the principal actor is the public prosecutor, 
who plays a similar role to that of the class counsel, by bringing the action on behalf of 
the victims, even if absent. The public prosecutor therefore bears the fixed costs, and 
makes civil protection more practicable for the individual plaintiffs, who will pay a 
value closer to the marginal cost  z . This situation can effectively reinstate the cost-
                                                 
18 What is  more,  full compensation  is also often  not achieved even in individual actions,  where the 
attorney in any case always has an incentive to appropriate part of any benefits.   22 
benefit balance.  
However, there are certain caveats which make this a weaker solution than class action: 
first of all, the objective function of the public prosecutor may differ from that of the 
victims, in the absence of those mechanisms for realignment of interests which class 
action instead incorporates. After all, we are dealing with a criminal proceeding that has 
the civil remedy as its externality, which leaves optimal choices very much to chance. 
For  example,  the  choice  of  which  offences  to  pursue  (albeit  in  accordance  with 
guidelines), and the amount of effort devoted to the lawsuit, are decisions taken by the 
public prosecutor independently of the wishes of the victims.  
Secondarily, the actions of the public prosecutor are necessarily restricted to offences 
pursuable in a criminal court, and so do not cover those wrongdoings which, though not 
classed as criminal offences, are nevertheless significant and punishable through tort 
law. In consequence, the route of criminal prosecution cannot be a substitute for class 
action, and at best can only serve to complement it. 
Furthermore, considering the starting hypothesis of a regulation failure, and given that 
public prosecutors have many elements in common with regulators, it is likely that the 
criminal action will also suffer from the same problems. 
The  second  available  option  is  that  of  successive  civil  actions,  forming  a  kind  of 
intertemporal  litigation  pool,  in  which  an  attorney  launches  a  pilot  action  and,  if 
successful,  follows  it  up  with  a  series  of  individual  actions.  Also  in  this  case,  the 
subsequent  actions  need  only  pay  the  marginal  cost,  benefitting  from  the  precedent 
which provides greater assurance of success. However this scheme is practicable only if 
the attorney is able to recover the fixed cost incurred for the first litigation. Therefore, if 
not all the victims take legal action, the intertemporal club will necessarily be of a 
smaller than optimal size, and the attorney will collect a fixed per capita fee that is 
necessarily lower. This will result in a lower incentive for the attorney. 
Moreover,  if  the  attorney  does  not  have  a  legal  monopoly  on  the  follow-on  legal 
actions,  once  the  precedent  has  been  produced  it  is  foreseeable  that  free-riding 
colleagues will enter and crowd out the market, at a lower price that does not include 
the  share  of  fixed  costs.  This  is  in  essence  the  argument  in  favour  of  the  natural 
monopoly, which in specific contexts is resolved precisely through the granting of legal 
monopolies; the law and economics literature has, for example, widely debated the case 
of knowledge and of the promulgation of specific intellectual property rights (Ramello,   23 
2011)
 19. 
Naturally, an alternative to class action, as also more generally to regulation and tort 
law, is provided by an insurance system. Now, such a system is particularly effective 
when the assets of the injurer are not able to cover the damages, and thus produce the 
problem of the 'disappearing defendant', which in practice implies limited liability and 
hence a suboptimal level of precaution (Summers, 1983). In this case, insurance is a 
further means for transferring the risks and costs in exchange for a known benefit. This 
solution is sometimes the only accessible one (hence the financial insurance mandated 
by law, as in the US) for activities that may result in environmental damage, precisely to 
prevent certain subjects from being judgment proof (Boyd, 2002).  
However insurance is at best a complement and not a substitute for the instruments and 
systems of tort law--including class action--for a number of reasons, the most obvious 
being that a frequent instances of collective actions have dealt precisely with insurance 
fraud (Issacharoff, 1997). 
Hence the availability of a number of alternative protection instruments, among which 
is class action, is better able to cover all the areas at risk.  
 
 
6.  Conclusions  
 
The different legal systems have gray areas, in which meritorious claims of victims may 
fail to be brought due to imperfections in the legal system, rather than due to lack of 
legitimacy.  This  is  tantamount  to  a  regulatory  gap,  which  in  practice  leaves  certain 
victims  unprotected  and  certain  wrongdoers  unpunished.  It  therefore  has  a  serious 
negative impact on the overall level of justice provided by a given system.  
Yet,  alongside  the  problem  of  justice,  there  emerges  an  equally  serious  problem 
connected with efficiency and individual behaviour: impunity creates an incentive to 
engage in harmful actions a source of profit, thanks to the possibility of transferring 
their cost to third parties. This has repercussions on the optimal number of accidents and 
                                                 
19  An  eloquent  example  is  Germany's  2005  enactment  of  the  Capital  Markets  Model  Case  Act 
(“Kapitalanlegerthe  Musterverfahrensgesetz”  or  “KapMuG”),  specifically  designed  enhance  investor 
protection through a system of test trials and linked actions. Interestingly, in order to solve the afore-
stated free-riding problem through the free market, there is also a complex proviso measure expressly 
devoted to avoiding opportunistic behaviour by spreading the fixed cost of the test litigation among all the 
plaintiffs (Vorwerk & Wolf, 2007).   24 
on their social cost. As a result, the economic system becomes less efficient, and some 
investments are directed toward the production of accidents, i.e. the level of care moves 
away from its optimal point. 
Class action is one of the possible remedies, which through an  amendment of civil 
procedure makes it possible to reinstate the completeness of tort law in a large number 
of cases. 
This article uses economic categories to show how the reorganisation of civil procedure 
is not merely aimed at providing a more efficient litigation technology, as hierarchies 
(and company law) might do for other productive activities, but that it also serves to 
create  a idiosyncratic economic organization ultimately  aimed  at producing  a set of 
goods, first and foremost among which are justice and efficiency.  
It is thus possible to rediscover, through economic analysis, not only the productive 
function of this legal machinery, but also that partial compensation of victims and large 
profits  for  the  class  counsel,  far  from  being  a  side-effect,  are  actually  a  necessary 
condition for reallocation of the costs and risks associated with the legal action. 
Therefore, even though some commentators are uncomfortable with the idea of "selfish" 
individual interests being used as an instrument for promoting collective welfare, class 
action  has  the  potential  to  recreate,  in  the  judicial  domain,  the  same  effects  that 
individual  interests  and  motivations,  governed  by  the  perfect  competition  paradigm, 
bring to the market. 
Class action can thus re-establish the alignment between public and individual interests 
where there are no credible alternatives. This potential makes it--notwithstanding the 
implementation  difficulties  and  possible  distorting  effects  of  its  attendant  economic 
opportunities--a desirable instrument for many insufficiently protected victims and, on 
the other hand, a fearsome adversary for the many injurers that continue to operate 
almost with impunity in many jurisdictions (and naturally fuel the opposition to the 
adoption of class action). 
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